S.M. Horman v. S. Spence Clark : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
S.M. Horman v. S. Spence Clark : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Raymond A. Hintze; Walker, Hintze & Brown; Attorneys for Appellants.
James S. Jardine; Craig Carlile; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Horman v. Clark, No. 860068.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/802
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K r U 
5' 
DOCKET NO. ••ff t f lPkg 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-
S. M. HORMAN, a general partner 
for HORMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah partnership, and S. M. 
HORMAN, JR., 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellant, 
S. SPENCE CLARK, as general 
partner for VALLEY SHOPPING 
CENTER ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BbOObgrCfV 
Case No. 20239 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT S. SPENCE CLARK 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, HONORABLE BRYANT H. CROFT, JUDGE, 
DISMISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT NO CAUSE OF ACTION 
RAYMOND A. HINTZE 
WALKER, HINTZE & BROWN 
4685 Highland Drive, #202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorneys for Appellants 
JAMES S. JARDINE 
CRAIG CARLILE 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 3850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3850 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE STTF~T 'F ~0TTT?r 
&±*\±± 
- O ' i O n i ) . 
S M. HORMAN, a general par*, i. 
for HORMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
a Utah partnership, and S. M. 
HORMAN, TP 
P l a i n i 11 i f. oiid 
S. SPENCh w-rr ,,. genera. 
pattner for VALLEY SHOPPING 
CENTER ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Defendant and 
Respondent:. 
1 i v i1 ^0239 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT g SPENCE CLARK 
APPEAL JbKU- ,^ L uuDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT CO- :-.: . HONORABLE BRYANT H. CROFT, JUDGE, 
DISMISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT NO CAUSE OF ACTION 
RAVWUW.. . MTZr 
WALKER, :-;:;TZE & BROWN 
46$5 Highland Drive, #2' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 
Attorneys for Appellants 
JAMES S. JAK. .:<h: 
CRAIG CARLILL 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
4 00 Deseret Building 
"
7
'-> South Main Street 
O. Box 385* 
Salt Lake City, .'.aa
 u-
"--t.^ rneys for ^-~- onden; 
Jbj^ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT CLARK HAD 
NO CONTINUING IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL DUTIES TO ' 
HORMANS ONCE HE COMPLETED THE CONTRACT BY GRANTING 
HORMANS THE PARKING PRIVILEGE 6 
A. The Existence of Implied Terms in a 
Contract is an Issue of Law 7 
B. Implied Contractual Duties or Conditions 
Are Not Favored in Law 7 
C. There Was No Implied Contractual Duty to 
List the Parking Agreement in a Warranty 
Deed or to Disclose it to Subsequent Purchasers . 8 
D. Any Implied Duty Not to Interfere With 
the Performance of a Contract Does Not 
Extend to the Facts of this Case 10 
II. CLARK HAD NO DUTY, CONTRACTUAL OR OTHERWISE, 
TO ENSURE THAT HORMANS WOULD RECORD THE PARKING 
AGREEMENT 14 
CONCLUSION 16 
ADDENDUM A-l 
Memorandum Opinion A-l 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law A-ll 
-i-
Parking Agreement A-22 
Warranty Deed A-24 
U.C.A. § 57-1-6 (1953) A-26 
U.C.A. § 57-1-12 (1953) A-27 
Adams v. Cuddy, 30 Mass. 460 (1833) A-28 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
A. Cases Cited 
Adams v. Cuddy, 30 Mass. 460 (1833) 14 
Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 94 Wash.2d 354, 
617 P.2d 704, (1980) 7 
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 
560 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1977) 10 
Dillon v. Morgan, 362 So. 1130 (La. App. 1978) 10 
Engle v. First National Bank of Chugwater, 
590 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1979) 14 
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) . . . . 10 
Fuller Market Basket, Inc. v. Gillingham & Jones, Inc., 
14 Wash. App. 128, 539 P.2d 868 (1975) 7 
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983) 12 
Marlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 
485 P.2d 1402 (1971) 10 
Mohr v. Sears, 239 Or. 41, 395 P.2d 117 (1964) 10 
Morris v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company, 
658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983) 6 
Pacific Venture Corp. v. Huey, 15 Cal.2d 711, 
104 P.2d 641 (1940) 10 
Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 
618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980) 9 
Pearson v. Shadix, 237 Ga. 817 229 S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 1976) . . 12 
Smith v. Long, 40 Colo. App. 531, 578 P.2d 232 (1978) . . . . 7 
Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980) 10 
Thompson v. Thompson, 1 Wash. App. 196, 
460 P.2d 679 (1969) 10 
-iii-
Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 
132 Ariz. 512, 647 P.2d 643 (1982) 
Zogarts v. Smith, 86 Cal. App.2d 165, 194 P.2d 143 (1948) 
B. Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1953) 
C, Secondary Authorities 
6A R. Powell, Powell on Real Property 1f 9064 (1984) . . 
-iv-
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court err in concluding, on the facts 
of this case, that Clark had no implied contractual duty to ensure 
the Hormans* continued use and enjoyment of the parking rights 
received under the contract which Clark had fully performed? 
II. Under the facts of this case, did the trial court 
correctly determine that Clark, the grantor of an interest in real 
property to Hormans, was not an insurer of Hormans' duty to record? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a September 11, 1984 judgment 
rendered after trial to the Honorable Bryant H. Croft of the Third 
Judicial District Court wherein he found that Appellants ("Hormans") 
had no cause of action against Respondent ("Clark") for breach of a 
written contract to convey parking privileges to Hormans. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This suit arose out of an agreement between Clark and the 
Hormans, who owned adjacent property, by which Clark conveyed to 
Hormans parking rights on his property. The Hormans failed to 
record that conveyance in a timely manner, and their parking rights 
were extinguished when Clark later conveyed the underlying parcel. 
Both Hormans and Clark have been involved extensively in the real 
estate industry for several decades, involving hundreds of real 
estate transactions. Trial Transcript 13-14 and 139-40. 
1. 1975 Agreement. 
In 1975, Hormans and Clark owned adjoining parcels of real 
estate, zoned for commercial use, located at approximately 4500 
South State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter referred to 
respectively as the "Horman Property" and the "Clark Property"). 
Findings of Fact, Record at 466. By Agreement dated July 7, 1975 
Hormans and Clark mutually agreed to convey a portion of their 
properties to Murray City for the construction of a road which 
would provide additional access to each property. (This Agreement 
shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Agreement".) As part of 
the Agreement Clark agreed to 
permit Hormans or their assigns with parking 
privileges for Hormans or Hormans' invitees or 
assigns to park on the parking lot in the rear of 
the Valley Shopping Center [Clark's property] in 
any of the stalls which are used for public 
parking.l 
Findings of Fact 2-7, Record at 466-67; see also Exhibit 6-P. 
The Agreement contained no other language imposing recordation or 
other post-conveyance duties upon Clark. 
2. The 1978 Recordation Of The Agreement. 
The format of the Agreement complied with Utah's recording 
statutes and was a recordable document. Duplicate originals of the 
document were executed and each party kept one original. Findings 
*The Agreement was signed by Horman in September of 1975 and 
by Clark in March of 1976, but was dated July 5, 1975. Thus, the 
Agreement was effective and all rights thereunder conveyed on July 
7, 1975. 
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of Fact 10 and 12, Record at 468, The Agreement was not recorded 
until January 12, 1978 when S.M. Horman, upon determining that it 
had never been recorded, took his copy to the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office and recorded it. Findings of Fact 13, Record at 
468. The uncontradicted expert testimony at trial showed that the 
custom and practice in Utah is that the grantee of an interest in 
property bears the burden of recording that interest so as to give 
notice of his interest to others. Trial Transcript 307. 
3. 1977 Sale By Clark Of Underlying Parcel. 
On March 15, 1977, prior to the time the Agreement was 
recorded, Clark agreed to convey his property to W. Weeks Wirthliri 
and his wife in a six-party real estate exchange agreement 
("Exchange Agreement"). The Exchange Agreement provided that the 
Clark property would be conveyed subject to "encroachments, 
easements and restrictions of record". Exhibit 9-P. Pursuant to 
the Exchange Agreement, Clark provided a warranty deed conveying 
the property to the Wirthlins and a preliminary title report 
prepared by Associated Title Company showing good and marketable 
title in Clark. The warranty deed provided that the property was 
subject to 
easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of 
way, encroachments and reservations appearing of 
record or enforceable in law or equity. 
Findings of Fact 14, 15 and 16, Record at 468-49, see also, 
Exhibit 10-P. No mention of the Agreement was made in the title 
report because Hormans had not yet recorded it. Findings of Fact 
16, Record at 469. The title company handling the real estate 
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exchange recorded the warranty deed to the Wirthlins on March 15, 
1977, approximately one year before Hormans recorded the 
Agreement. Findings of Fact 18, Record at 469. 
Because the Wirthlins and their transferee, the Grandale 
Finlayson Family Trust, took the property without notice of 
Hormans* interest, they were bona fide purchasers for value, and 
they obtained fee interest in the property unencumbered by Hormans1 
parking interest. Findings of Fact 19, Record at 469; see also, 
Appellants Brief 9. 
4. Hormans' Subsequent Development of Their Property. 
On or about July 1, 1980, S.M. Horman, Jr. obtained a 
building permit for a strip shopping center on the Hormans1 
property. The building permit was obtained from Murray City upon 
the representation that Hormans possessed a right to park on the 
adjacent property formerly owned by Clark. When it was learned 
that Hormans did not have the right to park on the Clark Property, 
Murray City reduced the amount of permitted occupiable space in the 
strip mall. Findings of Fact 26, 27, 31 and 33, Record at 470-472. 
5. Judicial Proceedings. 
Horman brought suit against Clark and others for lost 
profits and other damages resulting from the reduced occupancy. 
The suit was based initially on claims of fraud, breach of an oral 
contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of a written contract. 
Record at 2-6, 65-66, 76-83, 111-112. At the time of trial, Clark 
was the only remaining defendant and the only remaining claim was 
breach of the written Agreement. Record at 363-66, 372-73. 
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After reviewing all of the evidence presented at trial, 
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, as the trier of fact, entered a 
Memorandum Opinion holding that Hormans had no cause of action 
against Clark for breach of the written agreement to convey parking 
privileges. Record at 462. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Agreement grants to Hormans the right "to park on the 
parking lot in the rear of the Valley Shopping Center in any of the 
stalls which are used for public parking", a right conveyed to 
Hormans by Clark and enjoyed by Hormans from 1975 until March 1977 
when the Wirthlins recorded their fee interest in the property. By 
granting Hormans the parking privileges, Clark fulfilled every 
express obligation of the contract. 
The implied duties for which Hormans contend — a duty of 
good faith dealing, a duty not to interfere with property rights, a 
duty not to repudiate a contract, and a duty not to make perfor-
mance impossible -- are duties intended to assure the completion of 
the contract. However, this contract was completed once Clark 
granted Hormans the parking interest at which time all duties, 
whether express or implied, were satisfied. Clark did not have a 
continuing contractual duty to protect the benefits or property 
interest received by Hormans from subsequent defeasance. That duty, 
whether characterized as a duty to record or otherwise, rested with 
Hormans and arose at the time they received the interest. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT CLARK HAD NO CONTINUING 
IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL DUTIES TO HORMANS ONCE HE COMPLETED THE 
CONTRACT BY GRANTING HORMANS THE PARKING PRIVILEGE. 
Hormans* tried the case on a single cause of action in 
the Fourth Amended Complaint for breach of the written Agreement. 
In that Fourth Amended Complaint, Hormans specifically allege that 
Clark breached the Agreement in two ways: 
1) Defendant failed to disclose the existence 
of the agreement . . . to the new purchasers and 
failed to list the interest of the plaintiffs on 
the Warranty Deed conveying the property to the 
said third party purchasers. 
2) Defendant •interfere[ed] with the parking 
rights previously granted to Plaintiffs.* 
Fourth Amended Complaint II 6, Record at 364. 
The Agreement grants to Hormans the right "to park on the 
parking lot in the rear of the Valley Shopping Center in any 
of the stalls which are used for public parking."2 Hormans admit 
this parking right was granted to them in complete compliance with 
the terms of the Agreement: 
Such property right was a valid property 
interest and properly conveyed to plaintiffs by 
written document dated and signed on the 7th of 
July, 1975. 
Record at 396 (emphasis added); see also, Fourth Amended Complaint, 
If 3. Record at 363-64, Thus, Hormans possessed and enjoyed this 
2Horman contends that the Parking Agreement constitutes an 
easement rather than a revocable license. Appellant's Brief 7-9 
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Record at 396 (emphasis added); see also, Fourth Amended Complaint, 
1f 3. Record at 363-64, Thus, Hormans possessed and enjoyed this 
parking privilege from the date of the Agreement until March 1977, 
when the purchasers of the shopping center received and recorded 
their fee interest to the underlying shopping center land. 
Since Clark completed the contract by performing every 
express term of the Parking Agreement, Hormans necessarily seek to 
impose liability on Clark by implying covenants in the Agreement 
regarding Clark's duties after performance of that contract. 
A. The Existence Of Implied Terms In A Contract Is An Issue 
Of Law. 
The interpretation or construction of a contract is a 
question of law. E.g., Morris v. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Company, 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983). Thus, whether 
the Agreement contains the implied terms or duties for which 
Hormans contend is a question of law as applied to the facts which 
the trial court found. 
B. Implied Contractual Duties Or Conditions Are Not Favored 
In Law. 
Implied conditions are not favored in the law, e.g., 
2Continued: However, the basis for the trial court's decision 
made it unnecessary to resolve this issue. Record at 473-75. As 
correctly argued in Appellant's Brief, whether an agreement creates 
an easement or a revocable license depends on the parties' intent, 
and intent is a question of fact. It would thus be inappropriate 
for this Court to rule that the agreement created an easement, as 
requested by Appellant, which issue should be remanded for a factual 
determination of the parties' intent in the event of a reversal of 
the trial court's decision. Compare, Trial Transcript 21 with, 
Trial Transcript 121-22. 
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Fuller Market Basket, Inc. v. Gillinqham & Jones, Inc., 14 Wash. 
App. 128, 539 P.2d 868, 872 (1975), particularly when the implied 
term would result in a breach, e.g. , Smith v. Long, 40 Colo. App. 
531, 578 P.2d 232, 235 (1978). Thus, 
[b]ecause of the reluctance of courts to tamper 
with parties* written contracts, certain 
conditions have been imposed before a court will 
imply a covenant. These conditions have been 
summarized as: 
(1) The implication must arise from the 
language used . . .; (2) it must appear from the 
language used that it was so clearly within the 
contemplation of the parties that they deemed it 
unnecessary to express it; (3) implied covenants 
can only be justified on the grounds of legal 
necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only 
where it can be rightfully assumed that it would 
have been made if attention had been called to 
it; (5) there can be no implied covenant where 
the subject is completely covered in the contract. 
Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 132 Ariz. 512, 647 
P.2d 643, 646 (1982); accord, Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 94 
Wash.2d 354, 617 P.2d 704, 710-11 (1980). 
C. There Was No Implied Contractual Duty To List The Parking 
Agreement In A Warranty Deed Or To Disclose It To Subsequent 
Purchasers. 
No duty or covenant for Clark to list specifically the 
existence of the Agreement in his Warranty Deed for the entire 
shopping center property or to disclose its existence to subsequent 
purchasers can be implied in the Agreement for several reasons. 
First, there is no express language in the Agreement from 
which such "implication must arise". See Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. 
v. Plaza Center Corp., supra. Moreover, it does not "appear from 
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the language used [in the Agreement] that it was so clearly within 
the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to 
express" Clark's purported duty to disclose the Agreement to 
subsequent purchasers of the shopping center property. There is 
simply nothing in the language or meaning of the Agreement to 
suggest the implied duties for which Hormans argue. 
Second, there is no legal necessity here for the asserted 
implied duties. As discussed below, the recording statutes as well 
as custom and practice in Utah assign such duties to the buyer or 
recipient, see Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1953); Trial Transcript 
307, and if Hormans had recorded, disclosure by Clark to the 
Wirthlins would have been meaningless. Hormans argue for such 
duties by raising the spectre of fraudulent reconveyances of the 
same property. However, that argument fails because this case does 
not involve such a duplicate conveyance and because such fraudulent 
reconveyances are protected against by the tort laws.3 Indeed, 
Hormans seek a judicial rescue from their own recording failure by 
asking the court to write new terms and duties into its contract. 
But it is well settled that contracts should not be rewritten by 
courts to include terms addressed to such possibilities.4 
3Horman stipulated to the dismissal of the claims based upon 
fraud, unjust enrichment and breach of an oral contract. Record at 
372-73; compare Fourth Amended Complaint, Record at 363-366, with 
Third amended Complaint, Record at 111-12. 
4Courts should not rewrite contracts more favorable to one 
party than those contracts the parties themselves agree upon. "A 
court will not enforce asserted rights that are not supported by the 
contract itself." Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 
(Utah 1980) . 
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Third, there is simply no statutory or case law authority 
supporting the implied terms for which Hormans contend. That 
paucity of precedent is due to the radical departure of Hormans' 
contention: Even the covenants implied in warranty deeds do not 
extend as far as the duties Hormans seek to impose upon Clark, See 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1953). Here the parties used a written 
agreement with no warranties; Hormans simply received the parking 
rights for which they bargained. 
D. Any Implied Duty Not To Interfere With The Performance 
of a Contract Does Not Extend To The Facts Of This Case. 
Similarly, the alleged implied duty to deal in good faith 
or not to interfere with Horman's parking rights must be analyzed 
in terms of its proposed application in this case. Hormans argue 
that Clark's "obligation of fair dealing and good faith resulted in 
the obligation of permitting Horman parking privileges". 
Appellant's Brief 12. But Hormans admit that Clark fully conveyed 
the parking privileges. Fourth Amended Complaint 1f 3, Record at 
363-64 Thus, Clark met Hormans' test of good faith when he 
granted fully the parking rights. 
The only "interference" which Hormans really allege is 
that, after fully granting the parking rights to Hormans, Clark 
conveyed the underlying land to a third party. Hormans call that 
transfer an "interference" because it indirectly resulted in 
Hormans' loss of the parking rights, a loss resulting because the 
Agreement was not recorded. Thus, Hormans' theory would require 
Clark or any seller, before he could transfer fee simple to 
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property, to check or ensure that any lesser interest in the land 
was recorded. There is simply no authority for such a revolutionary 
shift of burdens in real estate conveyances in this state. See 
Trial Transcript 306-09 and 312. 
Hormans attempt to muster supporting case law authority, 
but none of their cases applies factually or legally. Hormans 
primarily, if not exclusively, rely on cases dealing with a party 
who fails to complete performance of a contract by voluntarily 
making his performance impossible.5 Those cases would apply here 
only if Clark had not conveyed the parking rights in the first 
place. However, where, as here, the interest was fully conveyed 
and the buyer thereafter asserts an implied, continuing duty on the 
seller to record the interest or to specifically disclose it to a 
subsequent third party purchaser, the cited cases have no relevant 
teaching. 
In a separate effort to overcome the adverse law, Hormans 
try to recast the case by characterizing Clark's position as 
follows: 
5The nine cases cited by Hormans which turn on a failure of 
initial performance are: Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979); Dillon v. Morgan, 362 
So. 1130 (La. App. 1978); Mohr v. Sears, 239 Or. 41, 395 P.2d 117 
(1964). Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1381 
(Utah 1977); Marlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 
1980); 485 P.2d 1402 (1971); Thompson v. Thompson, 1 Wash. App. 
196, 460 P.2d 679 (1969); Zogarts v. Smith, 86 Cal. App. 2d 165, 
194 P.2d 143 (1948); Pacific Venture Corp. v. Huey, 15 Cal.2d 711, 
104 P.2d 641 (1940) . 
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Respondent now argues that . . . Appellant's 
failure to record voided the contract, thereby 
enabling him to sell the property to another party. 
Appellant's Brief, 13. This "strawman" argument misstates Clark's 
position. Clark contends that Hormans* failure to record the 
Agreement ultimately resulted in an extinguishment of their parking 
right, but did not void the Agreement with Clark because that 
Agreement had already been completed and fully performed. The 
Agreement is not void even though the parking right was lost by 
Hormans. 
Hormans also argue that Clark is precluded from trans-
ferring the same interest or "granting two conflicting interests.? 
Appellent's Brief, 12 and 15. However, Clark clearly did not sell 
the same property or the same interest successively nor did he 
grant two conflicting interests. In 1977, Clark sold the 
underlying shopping center parcel; he did not sell the same parking 
rights he granted to Hormans. The situation where two successive 
sales of identical property are made is dramatically different, 
since such duplicate sales are inherently inconsistent. In such a 
case, defrauded buyers may have a claim for fraud. Here, however, 
and in a multitude of real property transactions, the grant of a 
lesser estate such as the parking right and the later conveyance of 
the underlying parcel are neither inconsistent nor conflicting. 
Indeed, under Hormans* theory of conflicting transfers, a property 
owner should never convey his property if he had previously granted 
a lesser interest, such as an easement or license or lease. 
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The case of Pearson v. Shadix, 237 Ga. 817, 229 S.E.2d 653 
(Ga. 1976), cited by Hormans is not relevant for precisely this 
reason. That Pearson case involved a boundary dispute between two 
lot owners in a subdivision where their respective deeds granted 
overlapping land. The Georgia court held for the lot owner who 
received his deed first, noting the developer "cannot thereafter 
convey legal title to the same land to another grantee." Id., at 
654 (emphasis added). The instant case does not involve conveyances 
of fee simple to two identical pieces of land. Indeed, but for 
Hormans' failure to record, there was and is nothing inconsistent 
or conflicting in separately granting an easement and then later 
conveying the underlying property. 
The weakness of Hormans1 argument can be seen by examining 
the case of Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), which 
Hormans proclaim to be "excellent authority for [their] position." 
Appellant's Brief, 15. In Johnson, plaintiffs sought to quiet 
title to certain property or to recover damages against the Bells. 
In 1966, Mr. Bell executed an installment contract with plaintiffs' 
predecessors in interest and also gave to them a quitclaim deed on 
an adjoining 80 acres. In 1967, plaintiffs redeemed the 80 acres 
from a tax sale. On September 9, 1974, the Bells executed a trust 
deed to Murray First Thrift on the 80 acres. Two weeks later the 
plaintiffs for the first time recorded the 1966 quitclaim deed to 
the 80 acres. Jd. at 309. 
Even though the same land had been conveyed twice, the 
Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs claims for damages against the 
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Bells because the "quitclaim deed carried [no] warranty of title" 
and because "plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with the 
Bells and no contractual liability is present". Id. at 312, 
Hormans' arguments from the Johnson case fail on two grounds. 
First, Hormans mischaracterize the holding in Johnson when they 
state that: 
The Court recognized a contractual cause of 
action between the original grantor and the 
original grantee. It is this contractual cause 
of action upon which Plaintiffs' claim is based. 
Appellants' Brief, 15. The Court in Johnson only held that: 
If any cause of action for damages exists 
against Bell because of breach of some contractual 
duty, such cause of action would be owned by the 
original grantees and not by plaintiffs. 
Johnson at 666 P.2d at 312 (emphasis added). Thus, the Johnson 
Court explicitly did not recognize any such cause of action, such 
a holding not being necessary. Second, and more importantly, the 
Johnson case involved the crucially different fact of a double 
conveyance of the same property -- and not, as here, conveyance of 
different and non-conflicting property interests. 
II. CLARK HAD NO DUTY, CONTRACTUAL OR OTHERWISE, TO ENSURE 
THAT HORMANS WOULD RECORD THE PARKING AGREEMENT. 
Hormans' argument depends on a mischaracterization of the 
trial court's conclusion of law that Hormans' failure to record 
relieved Clark of any contractual obligations. Appellants' Brief, 
9-10. However, the trial court held that the contractual duties 
sought to be imposed on Clark by Hormans do not exist, and 
recognized the protective effect the recording statutes would have 
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afforded Hormans had they recorded the Agreement. The Court did 
not relieve Clark of any contractual duties because all relevant 
duties had been performed. 
Notice to subsequent purchasers is given by the recording 
statute. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1953). Any implied duty to 
record is on the buyer - the Hormans in this case. "[P]arties who 
contract on subject matter concerning which known usages prevail 
incorporate into the agreement such implications if nothing is said 
to the contrary." Engle v. First National Bank of Chugwater, 590 
P.2d 826, 831 (Wyo. 1979). The unquestioned practice concerning 
recording is that "the recipient of an instrument of conveyance 
. . . takes it to the office of the proper recording agency" to be 
recorded. 6A Powell on Real Property 82-35 (1984); This practice 
was recognized as early as 1833 and has not been questioned since. 
Adams v. Cuddy, 30 Mass. 460 (1833). The expert testimony at trial 
was that in Utah the grantee of an interest records. Trial 
Transcript 307. 
Hormans lost their parking interest because they failed to 
record. They cannot escape this loss by attempting to create a 
wholly new implied contractual duty on Clark. Cf. Engle v. First 
National Bank of Chugwater, 590 P.2d at 830. Since the law assumes 
that grantees will record their interests in real property, and the 
custom and practice in Utah is for grantees to record interests in 
real property, Clark had a right to assume that Hormans had 
recorded their interest. The obligation for which Hormans argue 
would dramatically change the custom and practice in Utah (see 
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Record at 798-800), and impose on vendors of real property not only 
the burden of monitoring forever any interests or potential 
interests in numerous properties even though the vendor's only 
promise was to convey a certain interest, but would make the vendor 
an insurer against the recipient's failure to record, 
CONCLUSION 
There is no basis in law or under the facts of this case 
for the requested and radical rule of law shifting from Hormans to 
Clark the responsibility for continued protection of the benefits 
received by Hormans in full compliance with the Agreement. Contract 
law should not be altered to provide Hormans such additional 
protections not agreed to by the parties, particularly when the 
potential evils decried by Hormans are protected against by the 
laws of fraud and tort. Thus, the September 11, 1984 Judgment of 
Judge Croft should be affirmed,7 
DATED this fjM day of May 1985. 
James &\ Jardine 
Craig/£arlile 
Attorneys for Respondent 
7Appellants request this Court to order the "Trial Court to 
enter a money judgment in favor of the Appellants based upon the 
evidence at trial". Appellants' Brief 2. The evidence of damages 
is in sharp conflict. Compare, Trial Transcript, 156-159 with 
Trial Transcript 323-27 and Trial Transcript 371-82. Before any 
money judgment could be entered, the trial court would first have 
to find that Appellants suffered a loss which could not have been 
mitigated. Thus, if this Court finds some error in the trial 
court's findings or conclusions, remand is the proper remedy in 
view of the evidentiary issues which would then remain. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL ^ STRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH — x 
S. M. HORMAN, as General 
Partner for Horman 
Construction Co., a Utah 
Partnership and S. M. 
Horman, Jr., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
S. SPENCE CLARK, as General 
Partner for Valley Shopping 
Center Associates, a Utah 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-81-2129 
This case came on for trial before the Court on July 9, and 10, 
1984 with Raymond A. Hintze appearing as counsel for plaintiff, 
and James S. Jardine appearing as counsel for defendant- At the 
conclusion of the trial the Court took its decision under advisement 
and having considered the same, now renders its decision thereon. 
The case was filed on March 16, 1981 and was tried upon the 
issues arising out of the Fourth Amended Complaint filed February 24, 
1984, upon facts which may be summarized as follows: 
Plaintiffs were owners of a tract of land lying north of and 
continguous to the Valley Shopping Center owned by defendant and 
located at the northeast corner of the intersection of 4500 South and 
n
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State Streets in Murray, Utah. Defendant had acquired the shoppinc 
center from Horman in about 1970. The tract of land xwned by 
plaintiffs was vacant property being held by plaintiffs for future 
development. 
Being desirous of obtaining a break in the traffic control 
island along State Street to afford access to the center by 
southbound traffic, the defendant determined that it could do so 
only by dedicating land for construction of a road from State Stre< 
eastward to Fairbourne Avenue. Defendant thus commenced negotiate 
with Horman for a conveyance of a portion of their respective 
parcels of land to Murray City for construction of said roadway. 
These negotiations culminated in the execution of an agreement 
between plaintiff and defendant dated July 5, 1975, but which was 
not signed by S. M. Horman for the Construction Company until 
September, 1975, and was not signed by defendant until March, 1976 
Both signatures were acknowledged before a notary public. 
The agreement provided that Horman would deed to Murray City 
the south 35 feet of its parcel of land running east and west for 
about 460 feet and that defendant would deed to Murray City the 
north 15 feet of its shopping center land from State Street 
to Fairbourne Street; that defendant would obtain a deed from 
American Motors to Murray City of the south 35 feet of its propert 
fronting on State Street and contiguous to Horman's parcel on the 
west, (about 150 feet in length) and that Horman would not be 
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required to pave the street. The agreement also contained the 
following provision: 
It is understood between both parties 
hereto that Property Management and/or 
Valley Shopping Center Assoc, will permit 
Horman or its assigns with parking 
privileges for Horman or Horman invitees 
or assigns to park on the parking lot in 
the rear of the Valley Shopping Center 
in any of the stalls which are used for 
public parking. 
The agreement contained a legal description of the shopping center 
property. 
Both parties had a signed and notarized copy of the agreement. 
However, upon final execution of the agreement neither party had 
the agreement recorded in the County Recorder's office and it 
remained unrecorded until January 12, 1978, when S. M. Horman came 
upon the agreement m his files and took it to the Recorder's 
office where, upon determining that it had never been recorded, 
he then recorded it. 
However, on March 15, 1977, a real estate exchange agreement 
was executed by six parties, namely, Sterling Furniture, Modern 
Enterprises, W. Meeks Wirthlm and wife, Provswood, Auerbachs 
and defendant by which defendant agreed to and did convey its 
interest in the Valley Shopping Center to the Wirthlms, subject 
only to a first mortgage ($423,329), to a mortgage to Murray City 
that secured defendant's obligation to pave the street, and to 
"encroachments, easements and restrictions of record." The 
agreement required defendant to deposit by March 15, 1977 a 
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preliminary title report by Associated Title Co. showing good and 
marketable title in Valley and a warranty deed conveying the 
Center to the Wirthlins. This requirement was met and the warrant' 
deed contained the provision that the property was subject, among 
other things, to "easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of wa 
encroachments and reservations appearing of record or enforceable 
in law or equity." 
Since the agreement between plaintiff and defendant had not 
been recorded as of March 15, 1977, and was not recorded until 
March 12, 1978, as stated supra, no mention thereof was made 
in the title report. The agreement of March 15, 1977, reserved 
$46,000 from the funds to be paid to defendant to cover the cost 
of paving the roadway to be built upon the land conveyed to Murray 
City, and which was in fact constructed and completed. 
The warranty deed to the Wirthlins was recorded on March 15, 
1977 by the title company handling the real estate exchange. 
Thereafter the Wirthlins sold their interest in Valley Shopping 
Center to Arnold Development who in turn sold it to G. G. Finlaysoi 
and Janet F. Griffin who owned the center at the time of trial. 
At the time Horman recorded the agreement between the parties 
in March, 1978, he made no inquiry as to the then ownership status 
and thus did not know of the sale of the center by defendant to the 
Wirthlins. In 1980 the Horman property was conveyed to S. M. 
Horman, Jr., as trustee for his family and he then undertook to 
develop the property for business purposes. 
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Horman, Jr., obtained a building permit from Murray City 
about July 1, 1980, and commenced to build the outside walls with 
the intent to complete 20 interior units as lessees were obtained 
so each leased unit could be installed and completed in accordance 
with the desires of each lessee. The building permit records of 
Murray City left something to be desired, but minutes of a 
commission meeting dated May 1, 1980 reflected that Horman had 
explained that off-street parking for his building would be provided 
on a lot located on the south side of 4370 South Street, the 
street built pursuant to the agreement between the parties. 
As Horman proceeded with the construction of the building 
the difficulty leading to the filing of this lawsuit began to 
take shape when Finalyson learned in some way of the apparent 
parking easement which resulted in a letter by his attorney 
dated September 30, 1980, to Arnold Development requesting an 
adjustment in the purchase price because of the reported easement. 
A copy of this letter was designated for Horman Construction Co. 
On November 17, 1980 Finlayson's lawyer wrote a letter to Horman 
Construction attaching a copy of a letter written by Associated 
Title Co. dated November 3, 1980, which expressed the view that 
because of the late recording of the agreement between plaintiff 
and defendant, any easement for parking granted therein was 
ineffective against the Wirthlins and the subsequent purchasers. 
By letter dated December 30, 1980, S. M. Horman responded thereto 
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and continued to assert the easement was valid and discussed m 
detail the problems that would arise should the Horman business 
development lose its parking spaces. 
In the months that followed Murray City issued a stop order 
on the construction; building plans were altered and off-street 
parking spaces were constructed on the Horman property but these 
were about 22 spaces short of meeting the Murray City ordinance 
requirements for parking; negotiations were undertaken by the 
Hormans with Fmlayson to obtain spaces in the center; and leases 
were let based upon Murray City's approval of interior constructio 
for a 57% occupancy. The negotiations for parking in the center's 
parking lot between plaintiffs and defendant did not result in a 
successful conclusion so this lawsuit was filed March 16, 1981, an 
at the time of trial the occupancy allowance remained the same 
and the negotiations between Horman and Fmlayson were still 
being pursued as they had been during the prior 3% years. 
Amended pleadings were filed from time to time resulting in 
a dismissal of the case against the Wirthlms, Arnold, Fmlayson 
and Griffin. The filing of the Fourth Amended Complaint upon whic 
the case was tried was stipulated to upon the plaintiffs dropping 
their claims for relief based upon prior allegations of fraud and 
breach of an alleged oral promise by defendant's agent that he 
would record the agreement. The claims for relief set forth in th 
Fourth Amended Complaint were for an alleged breach of the agreeme 
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between the parties in that defendant (1) failed to disclose the 
existence of the agreement to new purchasers and (2) failed to 
specifically mention the Horman interest in the center's property 
on the warranty deed conveying the property to the Wirthlins, 
thereby allegedly breaching defendant's contractual duty not to 
interfere with the parking rights granted under that agreement. 
It was alleged that refusal by subsequent owners to allow parking 
privileges resulted in damages of lost rents and a diminution 
in the value of plaintiffs1 property. 
Much evidence and testimony were presented during the trial 
relating to construction problems, to negotiations for parking 
spaces, efforts with Murray City to obtain variances including 
even a vacating of the street, and to damages. But the significant 
factual issue centered around the alleged breach of a contractual 
duty not to interfere with the parking rights under the contract. 
The warranty deed by which defendant conveyed the shopping 
center property to the Wirthlins contained provisions that the 
conveyance was subject to the first mortgage, the performance 
mortgage to Murray City (also to a right of way over the north 
15 feet which was the parcel deeded to Murray City for roadway 
purposes), and to "easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of 
way, encroachments and reservations appearing of record or enforce-
able in law or equity." Plaintiffs assert that the failure to 
specifically set out in that deed that the conveyance was also 
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subject to the parking privileges under the contract was a breach 
of duty not to interfere. 
The agreement had all the necessary requirements for 
recording — acknowledged signatures and property description --
and it is thus readily apparent that had Horman recorded the 
agreement in March, 1976, after Clark signed it for defendant, 
it would have constituted notice to all that the contracted for 
parking rights were an encumbrance upon the property and would have 
been included in the provisions of the quoted language set forth 
in the preceding paragraph. Horman has had long experience in 
the acquisition, construction, management, sales and leasing of 
real property and to him the necessity of recording the agreement 
to protect his interest in the parking facilities at the center 
must have been well known to him and understood by him. Had he 
done so, this lawsuit would never have been filed. Having failed 
to do so, can plaintiffs now shift the responsiblity to defendant 
for the problems and damages that followed? 
While it may be true as alleged by plaintiffs that defendant 
had a duty not "to interfere" with the contractual rights of 
the plaintiffs, neither the sale of the property by defendant 
nor defendant's failure to either itself record the agreement 
nor to specifically mention the encumbrance in its deed to Wirthlir 
constitutes an interference with plaintiffs1 contract rights. 
The fact that the Wirthlins were bona fide purchasers for value 
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without notice of the unrecorded contract was the determining 
factor in precluding plaintiffs from retaining the parking privileges 
provided for in the contract. 
I find no duty upon the defendant to have recorded the 
agreement. In real estate transactions, it is a grantee's rights 
that are given protection by the recording statutes and that 
protection can only be obtained by the recording. I think the 
responsibility for doing so falls upon the grantee and such has 
long been the practice in real estate transactions. The law 
neither requires nor is it customary that a warranty deed conveying 
real property specifically list all of the valid, existing encumbrances 
of record. That is why title companies exist and that is why 
buyers and sellers both look to title reports to reveal such 
encumbrances of record. 
There is no evidence in this case that defendant knew 
the agreement with plaintiff had not been recorded when defendant 
entered into the six-sided real estate exchange agreement under 
which defendant sold to the Wirthlins, nor is there any convincing 
evidence that defendant knowingly or intentionally failed to 
disclose the parking privilege encumbrance when that real estate 
exchange agreement was negotiated. As stated supra, both the 
exchange agreement and the warranty deed to the Wirthlins contained 
provisions that would have preserved the parking privilege had 
Horman promptly recorded the agreement. Plaintiffs abandoned 
their prior claim that defendant breached an oral agreement to 
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record the agreement and indeed there was no implied duty to do so 
nor any obligation to make certain that Horman had done so. 
I thus find no breach of duty by defendant under the agreemen 
and must enter a verdict against the plaintiffs and in favor of 
the defendant of no cause of action. Having so ruled, the issue 
of damages need not be further considered. 
Counsel for defendant shall prepare appropriate Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment unless the parties by written Stipulatior 
otherwise agree as provided in Rule 52(c). 
Dat ed this £-5" "day of July, 1984. 
BRYANT tiJ. CROFT • (/ 
DISTRICT JUDGE (Retired) 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
By (!,/••/> *>/. X - <"<&• . — v . 
Deputy Clerk 
"FP If. 1334 
„..v_.5>^ C,*x/ 
JAMES S. JARDINE (A1647) and 
CRAIG CARLILE (0571) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 3850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3850 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-81-2129 
S. M. HORMAN, as General 
Partner for Horman Construction 
Co., a Utah partnership and 
S. M. HORMAN, JR., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
S. SPENCE CLARK, as General 
Partner for Valley Shopping 
Center Associates, a Utah 
partnership, 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
This matter came on before the Court for trial without a 
jury on July 9, 10 and 11, 1984. The plaintiff was represented by 
Raymond A. Hintze and the defendant was represented by James S. 
Jardine. The Court having considered the evidence, pleadings and 
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oral arguments submitted by the parties, and having entered a 
Memorandum Decision, the Court makes the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In 1970, defendant acquired from S. M. Horman the 
Valley Shopping Center located at the northeast corner of the 
intersection of 4500 South and State Streets in Murray, Utah. 
Plaintiff retained an undeveloped tract of land lying north of anc 
contiguous to the Valley Shopping Center. 
2. In 1975, defendant petitioned Murray City to make a 
median cut in the traffic control island along State Street at 
4370 South to afford access to the Valley Shopping Center by 
southbound traffic. 
3. Murray City agreed to make the requested median cut 
only if defendant, plaintiff, and American Motors Company would 
all dedicate portions of their property for the construction of a 
road from State Street eastward to Fairbourne Avenue. 
4. Defendant commenced negotiations with Horman and 
American Motors Company for a conveyance of a portion of their 
respective parcels of land to Murray City for the construction of 
said roadway. 
5. The negotiations between plaintiff and defendant 
culminated in the execution of an agreement between plaintiff and 
defendant entitled "Parking Agreement" 
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6. The "Parking Agreement" contained the following 
provision: 
It is understood between both parties hereto 
that Property Management and/or Valley Shopping 
Center Assoc, will permit Horman or its assigns 
with parking privileges for Horman or Horman 
invitees or assigns to park on the parking lot in 
the rear of the Valley Shopping Center in any of 
the stalls which are used for public parking. 
The agreement contained a legal description of the shopping center 
property. 
7. The "Parking Agreement" was dated July 5, 1975, but 
was not signed by S. M. Horman for Horman Construction Company 
until September, 1975, and was not signed by defendant until 
March, 1976. Both signatures were acknowledged before a notary 
public. 
8. The Agreement provided that Horman would deed to 
Murray City the south 35 feet of their parcel of land running east 
and west for about 460 feet and that defendant would deed to 
Murray City the north 15 feet of its property located between 
State Street and Fairbourne Avenue. American Motors Company 
agreed to deed the south 35 feet of its property running on State 
Street and contiguous to Horman's parcel on the west for about 150 
feet. Murray City ageed to make the requested median cut in the 
traffic control island located on State Street. 
9. Part of the agreement whereby all parties deeded land 
to Murray City included a provision that the Hormans would not be 
-3-
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required to pave the street running from State Street to 
Fairbourne Avenue. 
10. Both plantiff and defendant had a signed and 
notarized copy of the "Parking Agreement". 
11. Plaintiffs received everything agreed to in the 
Parking Agreement, and^styoyed the right to park on Valley Shoppinc 
Center property up until the time they were defeased of such 
rights through the recording of the Warranty Deed by W. Meeks 
Wirthlin, a bona fide purchaser. 
12. The Parking Agreement was a recordable document 
under Utah Law and had all the necessary requirements for 
recording. 
13. Upon final execution of the agreement, neither part] 
had the agreement recorded in the County Recorder's Office and it 
remained unrecorded until January 12, 1978 when S. M. Horman took 
his copy to the Salt Lake County Recorder's office where, upon 
determining that it had never been recorded, he then recorded it. 
14. On March 15, 1977, prior to the time the Parking 
Agreement was recorded by S. M. Horman, a Real Estate Exchange 
Agreement was executed by six parties, namely, Sterling Furniture, 
Modern Enterprises, W. Meeks Wirthlin and wife, Prowswood, 
Auerbachs and defendant, by which defendant agreed to and did 
convey its interest in the Valley Shopping Center to the 
Wirthlins, subject only to a first mortgage in an amount of 
$423,329.00, to a mortgage to Murray City that secured defendant's 
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obligation to pave the street, and subject to "encroachments, 
easements and restrictions of record." The six party "exchange 
agreement required defendant to provide by March 15, 1977, a 
preliminary title report by Associated Title Companpy showing good 
and marketable title in Valley Shopping Center and a Warranty Deed 
conveying the center to the Wirthlins. 
15. Defendant complied with the requirement to obtain 
and provide a preliminary title report and a Warranty Deed. 
16. The Warranty Deed contained the provision that the 
property was subject, among other things, to "easements, 
covenants, restrictions, rights of way, encroachments and 
reservations appearing of record or enforceable in law or 
equity". No mention of the Parking Agreement was made in the 
title report because it had not been recorded as of March 15, 
1977, the date of the title report. 
17. The six party exchange agreement of March 15, 1977, 
reserved $46,000.00 from the funds to be paid to the defendant to 
cover the costs of paving the roadway running from State Street 
eastward to Fairbourne Avenue which had been conveyed to Murray 
City. The roadway was constructed and completed. 
18. The Warranty Deed to the Wirthlins was recorded on 
March 15, 1977 by the title company handling the real estate 
exchange. 
19. The Wirthlins were bona fide purchasers for value 
without notice of the unrecorded contract. 
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20. There is no evidence that defendant knew the Parking 
Agreement with plaintiff had not been recorded when defendant 
entered into the six party real estate exchange agreement under 
which defendant sold the Valley Shopping Center to the Wirthlins. 
21. There is no convincing evidence that defendant 
knowingly or intentionally failed to disclose the parking 
privilege granted in the Parking Agreement when the real estate 
exchange agreement was negotiated. 
22. The Wirthlins subsequently sold their interest in 
the Valley Shopping Center to Arnold Development who in turn sold 
it to G. G. Finlayson and Janet F. Griffin who owned the center at 
the time of trial. 
23. At the time Horman recorded the Parking Agreement on 
January 12, 1978, he made no inquiry as to the ownership status 
and thus did not know of the sale of the center by defendant to 
the Wirthlins. 
24. In 1980, the Horman property was conveyed to S. M. 
Horman, Jr., as trustee for his family. 
25. Subsequent to receiving the subject property as 
trustee for his family, S. M. Horman, Jr. undertook to develop the 
property for business purposes. 
26. On or about July 1, 1980, S. M. Horman, Jr. obtained 
a building permit from Murray City for a strip shopping center and 
commenced to build the outside walls with the intention to 
complete 20 interior units as leases were obtained so that each 
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leased unit could be installed and completed in accordance with 
the desires of each lessee. 
27. The minutes of a Murray City commission meeting 
dated May 1, 1980 reflect that Horman had explained that off 
street parking for his building would be provided on the Valley 
Shopping Center property. 
28. Sometime prior to September 30, 1980, Mr. Finlayson 
learned of Mr. Hormon's asserted parking easement on the Valley 
Shopping Center property. On September 30, 1980, Rick D. Higgins, 
attorney for G. G. Finlayson, wrote a letter to Arnold 
Development requesting an adjustment in the purchase price of the 
Valley Shopping Center because of Mr. Horman's alleged right to 
park on Valley Shopping Center property. A copy of this letter 
was sent to Horman Construction Company. 
29. On November 17, 1980, Mr. Higgins wrote a letter on 
behalf of Mr. Finlayson to Horman Construction Company, attaching 
a copy of a letter written by Associated Title Company dated 
November 3, 1980, which expressed the view that because of the 
late recording of the agreement between plaintiff and defendant, 
any right for parking granted therein was ineffective against the 
Wirthlins and subsequent purchasers. 
30. On December 30, 1980, S. M. Horman, Jr., wrote in 
response to Mr. Higgins' letter of November 17, 1980. That letter 
continued to assert that the parking rights were valid and 
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discussed in detail the problems that would arise should the 
r 
Horman business development lose its parking spaces.'-' 
31. In April, 1981, Murray City issued a stop order on 
the construction of the strip center. 
32. As a result of the stop order, Mr. Horman altered 
the building plans and made provisions for off street parking 
spaces on the property owned by him. However, the Horman property 
was approximately 22 parking spaces short of meeting the Murray 
City ordinance parking requirements for a building the size being 
constructed. 
33. In August, 1981, Murray City issued 70% occupancy of 
the building. However, based on correspondence from Mr. Horman 
which mistakenly computed his parking spaces, Murray City approved 
57% occupancy of the building based upon the available parking 
spaces. 
34. The Hormans entered into negotiations with the 
Finlaysons beginning in December, 1980, for parking in the Valley 
Shopping Center's parking lot. 
35. At the time of trial the 59% occupancy allowance 
granted by Murray City remained the same and the negotiations 
between Horman and Finlayson were still being pursued. 
36. Horman has had long experience in the acquisition, 
construction, management, sales and leasing of real property and 
to him the necessity of recording the agreement to protect his 
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interest in the parking facilities at the Valley Shopping Center 
must have been well known and understood. 
37. It is the custom and practice in real estate 
transactions that the grantee record the instrument granting him 
rights, titles and interest in real property. 
38. It is not the custom or practice that a warranty 
deed conveying real property specifically list all of the valid, 
existing encumbrances of record. 
39. Pursuant to a stipulation permitting the filing 
of the Fourth Amended Complaint upon which the case was tried, 
plaintiffs dismissed their claims alleging fraud and breach of an 
alleged oral promise by defendant's agent that he would record the 
agreement. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The claims for relief set forth in the Fourth Amended 
Complaint were for an alleged breach of an implied contractual 
covenant to (1) disclose the existence of the Parking Agreement to 
the Wirthlins and (2) to specifically mention the Horman interest 
in the center's property on the Warranty Deed conveying the 
property to the Wirthlins. Plaintiff alleges that these two 
breaches constitute a violation of defendant's contractual duty 
not to interfere with the parking rights granted by the Parking 
Agreement. 
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2. Defendant complied with every express covenant in the 
Parking Agreement. 
3. It is the custom and practice in real estate 
transactions that the grantee record the instrument granting him 
rights, title and interest in real property. 
4. Defendant had no duty to record the Parking Agreement 
5. The responsibility for recording falls upon Horman, 
who was the grantee. 
6. In real estate transactions, it is the grantee's 
rights that are given protection by the recording statutes and 
that protection can only be obtained by recording the instrument. 
7. The real estate exchange agreement and the Warranty 
Deed from defendant to the Wirthlins contained provisions that 
would have preserved the parking privilege had Horman promptly 
recorded the Parking Agreement. 
8. The law does not require that a warranty deed 
conveying real property specifically list all of the valid, 
existing encumbrances of record. 
9. There was no implied duty in the Parking Agreement 
for defendant to record that agreement. 
10. Defendant did not breach any duty under the Parking 
Agreement, including but not limited to the duty not to interfere 
with rights granted by the agreement. 
11. The sale of the property by defendant did not 
constitute an interference with plaintiff's contract right. 
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12. Defendant's failure to record the parking agreement 
did not constitute an interference with plaintiff's contract 
rights. 
13. Defendant's failure to mention specifically the 
parking agreement encumbrance in its deed to Wirthlins did not 
constitute an interference with plaintiffs' contract rights. 
14. There being no breach of a contractual duty, the 
issue of damages was not considered. 
DATED this // -day of September, 1984. 
- .yVV. =. ' -X i U * £ — 
BRYANT/ H. CROFT 
District Judge (Retired) 
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THIS ACatOiEWT, ©ntared into thia 7th day of July, 1»?5, by and 
between valley Hhoooinq Center Aaslciates of felt !**• County. 
State of Utah, hereinafter referred to aa •Valley* end 
NOtottN CONSTRUCTtON COMPANY, of Salt Uke County, State of Utah, 
hereinafter referred to aa Nomin. 
MITNCSSCTlit 
Valley ia deairoua of open 1 no. up a rood through froo 
State Street to rairbourne Street. 
Horman owne a parcel of land located immediately north of the Valley 
Shopping Center building runninq eaaterly to fairbourna Street. 
morman hereby agrees to deed to Hurray City the south etrip of 
thia land 35 feet wide run run? east and west approximately 4S0 feet. 
Property Management owns .\h* Valley Shopping Center located **"f'7* ^UA'G 
immediately aouth of the fioman property and the American Motors
 A , 
property and Valley Shopping Center agree* to alao deed a 15 feet 
vide atrip of land running free* State Street on the vest to Fair-
bourne on the eaat auiking a 50 foot right-of-way for a rood froo 
State Street tnrough to Fairbourna. 
It ia also understood that Prooerty Management will obtain a deed 
from American Motors. Herein American Hotors will deed 35 foot 
of the south r-nd of their property running from State Street oaet 
to the Horman property. Thus permitting a thoroughfare through 
from State Street easterly to Fairbourne. 
It ia understood between both parties hereto that Property Manage-
ment and or Valley Shopping Center, Aseoc. will permit Herman or 
lta assigns wit'i parking privileges for Morman or Horman invitees -4 «,i^„ 
to park on the park*nq lot in the rear of the Valley Shopping Center 
in any of the stalls which arc used for public marking. 
It is aired by both parties hereto that each party M a mold onto m 
the other party $10.00 and other n?ood r*d valuable consideration, f> 
a recoup of whirh la hereby acknowledged. It la hereby eg rood ]f 
and undrr*tr>o(! that Gorman will not be renulrud to move the etroet. J dcr*tr>o»! that >orman w 
/ !/ * 
Vafley Snopoin<? Center Associates W>**M* CnwSTtUCTIflsl OTMPAJH • FDEPOSITION 
S. H. Homan, Prvsident • ( EXHIBIT 
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WARRANTY DEED 
(Special) 
VALLEY SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES, a Limited Partnership 
of Salt Lake City, Utah 
CONVEY AND VAWLANT against all claiming by, through or under 11 
grantor 
hereby 
t 0 W. MEEKS WIRTHLIN and BETTY JO G. WIRT11LIN, h i s w i f e , as tenants in common 
grantee* 
of s * u L*ke c l L y * U t a h for the sum of 
TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration SQCUKRK 
the following described tract of land in s a l t Lake County, 
State of Utah: 
SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE A 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 15th day of 
March , A . D. 19 77 
Signed in the Presence of ) J ! ^ ^ 
) ST SPENCE CLARK, cfeneraT Partner* 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 15th day of March A. D. 1977 personally appeared before me S. SPENCE CLARK 
who being by me duly sworn did say that he is a General Partner of VALLEY SHOPPING 
CENTER ASSOCIATES, a Limited Partnership, and that the foregoing instrument was 
signed in behalf of said Limited Partnerahip by authority of the Partnership 
Agreement of said Limited Partnership, and said S. SPENCE CLARK acknowledged to 
me that said Limited Partnership executed the same. 
Addendum A-24 ^ > \ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Commission Expires: 10/13/80 Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah 
Beginning at a point en the East line of State Street at a point South 142.48 feet 
and East 906,21 feet (old deed ties would nuke this South 156.42 feet and East 
917.40 feet) from the West quarter comer of Section 6, Tcwnship 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, arrf running thence North 0°05f30" East along 
said East line 432.24 feet; thence North 89°51f East 572,28 feet to the center of 
Fairbourne Street; thence South 0°05,30" West along the center of said Street 
217.52 feet; thenoe South 89p51' West 165.00 feet; thenoe North 0*05'30" East 
35.42 feet; thenoe South 89051f West 54.51 feet; thence South 0#05,30n West 285.31 
feet to the North line of State Highway (Project US-0144 (7);. thence North 88°16f! 
Vtest along said North line 126.27 feet; thence North $9*09f West along said North 
line 78.00 feet; thence North 0°05'30" East 29.78 feet; thence South 89°51' West 2 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to a Right of Kay over the North 15 feet thereof, so long as said Right oi 
Way does not conflict with the existing building. 
EXCEPTING THEROTEM: Beginning at a point 1003 feet East and 188 feet North of ti 
Southwest comer of the Northwest quarter of Section 6, Itwnship 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence South 14 feet; thence East 24 feet; 
thenoe North 14 feet; thenoe West 24 feet to the point of beginning. 
•together with a Right of Way through a 10 foot alley adjacent to said property 
with ingress and egress to and from the same and for the laying of pipes undernea' 
the surface. 
This conveyance la made and accepted subject to a Trust Deed in favor of PACIFIC 
MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY recorded January 26, 1967 in Book 2525 at Page 473 
of Official Records, having an unpaid principal balance of $423,329.92 as of 
March 1, 1977. 
This conveyance is also made and accepted subject to a Performance Mortgage in fav 
of MURRAY CITY CORPORATION recorded November 22, 1976 in Book 4412 at page 394 of 
Official Records. 
Subject to easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of way, encroachments and 
reservations appearing of record or enforceable In lav or equity and taxes for 
the year 1977 and thereafter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1953): 
Recording necessary to impart notice — 
Operation and effect — Interest of person not 
named in instrument. Every conveyance of real 
estate, and every instrument of writing setting 
forth an agreement to convey any real estate or 
whereby any real estate may be affected, to 
operate as notice to third persons shall be 
proved or acknowledged and certified in the 
manner prescribed by this title and recorded in 
the office of the recorder of the county in which 
such real estate is situated, but shall be valid 
and binding between the parties thereto without 
such proofs, acknowledgement, certification or 
record, and as to all other persons who have had 
actual notice. Neither the fact that an 
instrument, recorded as herein provided, recites 
only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that 
the grantee in such instrument is designated as 
trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise 
purports to be in trust without naming the 
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust, 
shall operate to charge any third person with 
notice of the interest of any person or persons 
not named in such instrument or of the grantor or 
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or 
such lesser interest as was conveyed to him by 
such instrument free and clear of all claims not 
disclosed by the instrument or by an instrument 
recorded as herein provided setting forth the 
names of the beneficiaries, specifying the 
interest claimed and describing the property 
charged with such interest. 
Addendum A-26 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1953): 
Form of warranty deed — Effect. Conveyances of 
land may be substantially in the following form: 
WARRANTY DEED 
(here insert name), 
grantor, of (insert place of 
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to 
(insert name), grantee, of 
(insert place of residence), for the sum of 
dollars, the following described 
tract of land in County, 
Utah to wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of grantor this day 
of 19 . 
Such deed when executed as required by law 
shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee 
simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of 
the premises therein named, together with all the 
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto 
belonging, with convenants from the grantor, his 
heirs and personal representatives, that he is 
lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good 
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the 
grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet 
possession thereof; that the premises are free 
from all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his 
heirs and personal representatives will forever 
warrant and defend the title thereof in the 
grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful 
claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such 
covenants may be briefly inserted in such deed 
following the description of the land. 
Addendum A-27 
SUFFOLK AND NANTUCKET. 
EDWARD ADAMS versus WILLIAM CUDDY. 
Tbe owner of a tract of land in Boston conveyed a portion of it, describing suck 
portion by metes and bounds ; subsequently, he ei ecu ted another deed, conveying 
" ail the right and title to the land I have in Boston/' to a second grantee, which 
was registered before the pnor deed. It was held, that the portion of land described 
in the prior deed did not pass to the second grantee, as coming within the general 
description of the estate con\eyed in the subsequent deed. 
In an action between parties claiming respectively under a prior deed containing 
covenants of seisin and warranty, and a subsequent deed which was registered first, 
not containing any covenant, it was held, that the grantor, whose ongiual title was 
good and indefeasible, was a competent witness to prove that the subsequent gran-
lee bad notice of the pnor conveyance. 
If a grantee takes with notice of a prior unregistered deed, and conveys to a second 
grantee with like notice, the second grantee, as well as the first, is precluded from 
setting up the subsequent deed against the pnor unregistered deed. 
TRESPASS quart clausum. The defendant pleaded soil 
and freehold in himself; and issue was taken on that fact. 
Upon a case stated it appeared, that the locus in quo was 
parcel of a larger tract of land in South Boston, which was 
set off to Sarah Baker, wife of William Baker, upon the 
division of the estate of her father, James Blake, deceased, 
and that both parties claim title from her. 
On December 21, 1807, William Baker executed a deed 
with covenants of seisin and warranty, purporting to convey 
the locus in quo to Jonathan Simonds in fee, and describing 
it accurately by metes and bounds. The wife of Baker join-
ed in the deed, according to the following clause : " In wit-
ness whereof I the said William Baker, and my wife, in 
consideration of one dollar paid to me by said Simonds, do 
forever quit my right and fee in said premises, and we have 
hereto set our hands and seals," &c. This deed was not 
recorded till June 3, 1803. On June 17, 1808, Simonds 
conveyed the same land to the plaintiff, and the deed wis 
recorded on the sane day. 
On March 24, 1808, William Baker and wife executed 
• deed to William^ father, Allen Baker, containing the fol-
lowing clauses, to wit: " I, William Baker &c. and Sarah 
Baker, my wife, in her right, for in consideration of six hun-
dred dollars paid me by my honored father, Allen Baker & c , 
I do, by these presents, the receipt acknowledge, and release 
Addendum A-28 
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and forever quitclaim all the right and title to the land I have Adams 
in South Boston, so called, fonnerly a part of the estate Cuddy. 
of James Blake, housewright, deceased : — And I, Sarah 
Baker, for myself, for the above sum mentioned do, for my-
self, forever release and forever quitclaim all my right and 
title to my honored father aforesaid, together with my right 
of dower, the receipt whereof we do hereby acknowledge, 
grant, bargain, sell and convey unto our honored father afore-
said, to him, his heirs " &c. This deed contained no cove-
nant. It was recorded on March 28, 1808. 
On the decease of Allen Baker, Rebecca Baker, his wid-
ow, was appointed administratrix of his estate, and being 
duly authorized to sell his real estate, for the payment of his 
debts, conveyed to Calvin Baker, by a deed dated March 
20, 1818, and recorded the next day, all the interest of the 
deceased in a certain tract of land in South Boston, described 
by metes and bounds. This tract was a portion of the land 
let off to Sarah Baker and included the locus in quo. Cal-
vin Baker, by a deed dated November 8, 1821, and record-
ed the next day, conveyed the same tract to the defendant. 
The depositions of William and Sarah Baker, who were 
both living at the time of the supposed trespass, were put 
into the case, for the purpose of showing, that at the time 
when they conveyed to Allen Baker, he had notice of the 
prior deed to Simonds. 
It was agreed, that if the plaintiff was entitled to recover, 
the defendant should be defaulted, and judgment rendered for 
the plaintiff for 30 dollars damages and costs ; otherwise the 
plaintiff was to become nonsuit. 
The case was argued in writing by D. A. Simmons, for 
the plaintiff, and Rand and Fiske, for the defendant. 
SHAW C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court. The ^a r c* IW 
question between these parties is a question of title only, it 
being admitted that the defendant has done acts, which if 
he cannot justify on the ground of title, amount to a trespass 
The first question is, upon the effect of the deed of Wil-
liam Baker and wife to Simonds. It is certainly a very im-
perfect, illiterate, and ill drawn conveyance. It is contend-
ed, that there are no words of grant or conveyance on the 
3 9 * 
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part of the wife ; and this certainly seems to be the case, if, 
according to the natural and grammatical construction of the 
language, the words are those of the husband only. But 
we do not consider that the Court is called on to decide 
what quantum of estate passed by this deed. If any estate 
passed and that continued till the time of the alleged tres-
pass, it is sufficient for this action. 
The husband was seised in right of his wife. It does not 
appear by the facts, whether there were children of the mar-
riage ; if there were, the husband had an inchoate tenancy 
by the curtesy, which was an estate for his own life ; but 
if there were not, he had a freehold, determinable upon the 
contingency of surviving his wife. In either way of con-
sidering it, he had a seisin ; and such estate as he had pass-
ed by his deed to his grantee. It appears by the depositions 
in the case, that William Baker and his wife were both liv* 
ing, when the supposed trespass was committed, and there-
fore that the plaintiff had a title at that time sufficient to 
enable him to maintain the action. 
But another ground of defence more confidently relied 
upon, is, that before the above deecf was registered, the same 
estate was conveyed to Allen Baker, father of William, 
through whom the defendant claims, without notice of the 
prior conveyance, and the subsequent deed was first regis-
tered ; and so that the defendant has the better title ; and 
the dates of the execution and registry of the respective 
deeds would seem to maintain this ground. 
To this the plaintiff makes two answers, first, that the subse-
quent deed from William Baker and wife, to his father Allen 
Baker, did not include the land before conveyed to Simonds; 
and secondly, that Allen Baker, the grantee, had notice of 
the prior conveyance to Simonds. 
That the administratrix of Allen Baker supposed that 
the deed from William to his father embraced the premises, 
is manifest from the fact, that she included that parcel in 
her deed to Calvin Baker, made in pursuance of a sale under 
a license ; and Calvin Baker, in like manner, included it in 
his deed to the defendant. But if the estate did not vest in 
Allen Baker, then his administratrix had no authority to 
M A R C H T E R M 1833. 
convey it, wd her deed was void. And the Court are all 
of opinion, that the deed of William Baker and wife to his 
father, did not embrace the premises. This deed is quite 
AS illiterate and informal, as the one above remarked upon. 
It is however, the deed of William Baker and his wife, and 
all the clauses of grant and release, are die language of both, 
and bind the estate of both ; and informal as it is, it is to have 
its legal effect. The deed contains no covenants, of any 
kind. The words, " grant, bargain, sell and convey," are 
contained, but they come after the description, the words 
preceding it being " release and quitclaim." But without 
placing any reliance upon these informalities, we rest our 
opinion upon this ; that examining the deed most critically, 
it does not purport to convey any land specifically, but only 
44
 all the right and title to the land I have in South Boston, 
formerly a part of the estate of James Blake, housewright, 
deceased " ; and then afterwards the wife adds, " all my right 
and utle to my honored father aforesaid " ; probably the word 
44
 estate " of her father's was omitted by mistake. Now, we 
think the effect of conveying all the right and title I have, 
by fair construction, means all that has come to me and that 
1 have not legally parted with. But the deed to Simonds, 
whether registered or not, gave a good title as against the 
grantor and his heirs. This therefore he had legally parted 
with, and it did not come within the general description of 
the estate conveyed. Were it construed otherwise, the grant-
ors might in effect commit a fraud, without intending or even 
being conscious of it. Where a grantee takes by so indefi-
nite a description as the right which the grantor has, he must 
take the risk of his grantor's right. 
But upon the other ground, we are strongly inclined to 
the opinion, that the plaintiff has the better tide. We do 
not perceive, that William Baker and Sarah Baker were 
not competent witnesses. In the deed to his father, there 
is no covenant. In that to Simonds there are covenants of 
seisin and warranty. It is agreed, that William Baker and 
his wife were then seised and had a good and indefeasible 
title. Shoujd^Simonds or his grantee lose their title in con-
sequence of not registering their deed, the warrantor would" 
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Adams not be liable on his warranty for such_d$kcL~-There seems 
Cuddy. t 0 ^e no case in which Baker can be liable on his warranty; 
and if so, he is disinterested and a competent witness. 
The effect of his testimony is, that when he conveyed to 
his father, the latter had notice of his prior conveyance to 
Simonds. If such was the case, he could never set up his 
title, though his deed was first registered, against the prior 
unregistered deed to Simonds. And though if Calvin Ba-
ker and the defendant had taken a deed from Allen, with-
out notice of such defect in his title, the title might be in-
defeasible in them, yet this principle would not apply here, 
as they did not take a deed of him, but of his administratrix, 
who could only sell such estate as he had. But what is 
more important, before the defendant took his deed of Cal-
vin Baker or the latter t k his of the administratrix, the 
deeds from William Baker to Simonds and from the latter 
.0 the plaintiff, had been recorded ; which was constructive 
notice to them. Now I take the rule to be, that if a gran-
tee takes with notice of a prior unregistered deed, and he 
conveys to a second grantee, with like notice, the second, 
&> well as the first, is precluded from setting up the subse-
quent deed, against the prior unregistered deed. 
Defendant defaulted 
